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Does the objective of ICSID annulment jurisprudence invite an appellate mechanism?- A 
critical evaluation 
Abstract 
The ICSID annulment history suggests that upholding the arbitral award’s finality is the 
main objective of annulment jurisprudence and the reasons for adopting such finality were 
the Convention-drafters’ desires for expeditious and economic resolution of the dispute. 
However, in recent years, the belief concerning the consumption of more time and costs 
within appellate system has undergone change, and consequently, a demand for the 
appellate mechanism in ICSID has gained momentum. 
I. Introduction 
Under article 52 of the ICSID Convention, an ad hoc Committee1 is empowered either to 
annul any arbitral award or reject the annulment application. This mechanism is considered as the 
most significant,2 exceptional,3 drastic and a limited remedy4 because in this mechanism the parties 
do not have any other alternative but to arbitrate the same issues further by a newly formed ICSID 
tribunal.5 Such nature of remedy does not allow the ad hoc Committee to review the substantive 
correctness of the tribunal’s award. Nevertheless, some ad hoc Committees have delivered their 
decisions by adopting a more expansive substantive review than their permissible periphery of 
review authority.6 As a result, there arose some demands of adopting an appellate mechanism in 
ICSID system. This has created confusion regarding the objective of the ICSID annulment 
mechanism. 7  Should the ad hoc Committees follow limited review mechanism to uphold the 
objective of finality? Or should the Committees adopt substantial review mechanism with a view to 
finding the correctness of the awards? If the objective of finality does not serve the desired purpose, 
what reformations in the ICSID review regime could work better? In such backdrop, Part- II of this 
article describes a brief overview of the ICSID annulment mechanism. Part- III endeavors to 
                                                 
1 Ad hoc Committee may be addressed as ‘annulment committee’ too.  
2 Lucy Reed, Jan Paulsson, et al., Guide to ICSID Arbitration, (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2010) 162 
3 ICSID Secretariat, ‘ICSID 1986 Annual Report: Introduction of the Secretary General Ibrahim F.I. Shihata’ 4 
4 Herbert Smith, ‘ICSID Annulment Awards: The Fourth Generation’ (February 2011) 
<www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7218cb56-7a64-426f-8cc0-8475303444e6> accessed 09 August 2016  
5 Reed and Paulsson, n 2, 162 
6 Dohyun Kim, ‘The Annulment Committee’s Role in Multiplying Inconsistency in ICSID Arbitration: The Need To 
Move Away From Annulment-Based System’ (2011) 86 New York University Law Review 242. 
7 Ibid 
3 
determine a concrete objective of the ICSID annulment by analyzing its history. Part- IV compares 
the question of time and costs efficacy in an annulment mechanism with those of an appellate 
system. Part- V discusses the existing demands for an appeal facility in the ICSID review system. 
Lastly, Part- VI puts forward a prospective framework of an appellate mechanism for ICSID. 
 
II. Brief overview of the ICSID annulment mechanism 
ICSID annulment is a review regime against the awards rendered by an ICSID tribunal. In other 
arbitral systems, such review regime is called ‘setting aside’, ‘annulment’ or ‘vacatur’8 where the 
courts or superior tribunal possess the powers to set aside, modify, remit or declare an award as 
having no effect in whole or in part. In the ICSID system, the word ‘annulment’ denotes erasing an 
arbitral award as if it was never rendered.9 If the parties desire to arbitrate the dispute again, it must 
be submitted to a newly constituted tribunal 10  which will follow the same proceedings as it 
followed in the original arbitration.11 In case of partial annulment, the newly formed tribunal shall 
not reexamine any part of the award not so annulled.12 However, an application for annulment may 
be submitted by either party to the proceedings on one or more of the grounds specified in article 
52(1) of ICSID Convention. The grounds are: (a) improper constitution of tribunal; (b) manifest 
excess of powers; (c) corruption on the part of a member of the tribunal; (d) serious departure from 
a fundamental rule of procedure; (e) failure to state reasons on which award is based.13 In practice, 
a request for annulment typically invokes a number of aspects each of which allegedly should lead 
to the annulment of award.14  
The Secretary-General of ICSID will register an application15 and the Chairman will constitute 
an ad hoc Committee of three persons to hear the review of the award.16 During this appointment, 
the Chairman will select the members only from a ‘panel of arbitrators’. 17  This ‘panel of 
                                                 
8 Kateryna Bondar, ‘Annulment of ICSID and Non-ICSID Investment Awards: Differences in the Extent of Review’ 
(2015) 32 (6) Journal of International Arbitration, Kluwer Law International 621, 628 
9 David Collins, ICSID Annulment Committee Appointments: Too Much Discretions for the Chairman (2013) 30 (4) 
Journal of International Arbitration 333, 335 
10 ICSID Convention art 52(6) 
11 ICSID Arbitration Rules, rule 55(2)(d) 
12 ICSID Arbitration Rules, rule 55(3) 
13 ICSID Convention art 52(1) 
14 Christoph Schreuer, ‘From ICSID Annulment to Appeal Half Way Down the Slippery Slope’ (2011) 10 The Law and 
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 211, 213 
15 ICSID Arbitration Rules, rule 52 
16 ICSID Convention art 52(3) 
17 ICSID Convention art 52(3) 
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arbitrators’ 18 is a special list of arbitrators consisting of persons designated by the Contracting 
States19 and the Chairman.20 Each Contracting State may designate up to four persons and the 
Chairman may designate up to ten persons to this panel.21 However, if any panel member had a 
prior connection with any of the parties through nationality or designation to the panel or working 
as arbitrator or conciliator in favor or against any of them, that member will be regarded 
disqualified for the Committee concerned.22  
 The ad hoc Committee is allowed to exercise a limited form of authority. It only has the 
power to annul the award or any part thereof on any of the grounds specified in the ICSID 
Convention.23 Like an appellate court, it cannot modify or remit any award rather it erases the 
existence of an award. The annulment process does not give the ad hoc Committees the power to 
revise an award on the merits or to reopen the tribunal’s decision on the evidence.24  
 
III. Objective of ICSID annulment jurisprudence: a detour to the history of annulment 
 Throughout the history of ICSID annulment, the decisions of different Committees elaborated 
and explained the objective of the annulment procedure. On the basis of consistency in the 
decisions, Schreuer classified the history of ICSID annulment into three generations.25 The first 
generation contains the first two annulment cases known as Klöckner I26 and Amco I27. The second 
generation consists of the decisions in MINE28, Klöckner II29and Amco II30. The third generation is 
                                                 
18 ICSID Convention art 3 
19 ICSID Convention art 13(1) 
20 ICSID Convention art 13(2) 
21 ICSID Convention art 13 
22 ICSID Convention art 52(3) 
23 ICSID Convention art 52(3) 
24 Claire Stockford, Appeal Versus Annulment: Is the ICSID Annulment Process Working or Is It Now Time For An 
Appellate Mechanism? in Ian A Laird, Todd J. Weiler (eds), Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law (Juris 
Publishing 2012) 311 
25  Christoph Schreuer, ‘Three Generations of ICSID Annulment Proceedings’ 17-19 < 
www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/69.pdf> accessed 10 August 2016. 
26 Klöckner I v Republic of Cameroon (ICSID Case No. ARB/81/02) Decision on Annulment 3 May 1985 
27 Amco I Asia Corporation v Republic of Indonesia (ICSID Case No. ARB/81/01) Decision on Annulment 16 May 
1986.  
28 Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v Republic of Guinea (ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4) Decision 
of partial Annulment 22 December 1989 
29 Klöckner II v Republic of Cameroon (ICSID Case No. ARB/81/02) Decision on application for Annulment 17 May 
1990 
30 Amco II Asia Corporation v Republic of Indonesia (ICSID Case No. ARB/81/01) Decision on application for An-
nulment 17 December 1992 
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based on two decisions of the annulment Committee in Wena 31  and Vivendi I 32 cases. This 
classification has also been endorsed by some other commentators.33 Of them, Stockford34 extended 
the third generation to 2000 onwards whereas Marchili 35  termed the same period as fourth 
generation. The two first generation decisions have received severe criticism by the commentators 
because of reviewing the merits of the two cases and inappropriately going beyond the line of 
difference between annulment and appeal.36 Concerns raised in this first generation of cases were 
addressed by the second generation of decisions.37 The third generation cases are considered to 
reinforce the distinction between appeal and annulment setting out parameters of the extent of 
powers of an annulment Committee.38 
  Some Committees, e.g. Klöckner II39,CMS40, Vivendi II41, observed that the annulment is 
neither an appeal nor any like remedy.42 This has also been observed in the case of Patrick Mitchell 
stating, ‘….that an annulment proceeding is different from an appeal procedure and that it does not 
entail the carrying out of a substantive review of an award’.43 Therefore, the decisions of ad hoc 
Committees established that it is in no way an appellate body, nor authorized to carry out a 
substantive review into the matters with a view to checking correctness of tribunal’s decision. 
                                                 
31 Wena Hotels Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4) Decision on application for Annulment 
5 February 2002. 
32 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. (Vivendi I) v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/3) Decision on application for Annulment, 3 July 2002 
33 Silvia M Marchili, ICSID Annulment: A Saga of Virtue and Vice 283 and Claire Stockford, Appeal Versus Annul-
ment: Is the ICSID Annulment Process Working or Is It Now Time For An Appellate Mechanism? 307 in Ian A Laird, 
Todd J. Weiler, n 24. 
34 Stockford, n 24, 319-28 
35 Marchili, n 24, 289-300: Mitchell, Malaysian Historical Salvors, CMS, Sempra, Enron cases constitute fourth gen-
eration according to this commentator. 
36 George R Delaume, ‘The Finality of Arbitration Involving States: Recent Developments’ 5 Arbitration International 
21, 32 (1989); Mark B Feldman, ‘The Annulment Proceedings and the Finality of ICSID Arbitral Awards, 2 ICSID Re-
view-Foreign Investment Law Journal 85 (1987) cited in Schreuer, Three Generation, n 25, 18. 
37 Schreuer, Three Generation, n 25, 18 
38 Stockford, n 24, 320 
39 Klöckner II, n 29, para 5.07 
40 CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8) Decision on the Application of 
Annulment 25 September 2007 para 43  
41 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A.(Vivendi II) v Argentine Republic (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/3) Decision on the Application for Annulment 10 August 2010 para 247(i) 
42 Schreuer, n 14, 212 
43 Patrick Mitchell v Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7) Decision on the Application for 
Annulment 1 November 2006 para 19. 
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Subsequently, some other Committees commented that the Committee does not have the 
jurisdiction to review the merits of the original award,44 consider the substance of the dispute,45 and 
substitute its own analysis of law and fact with that of the arbitral tribunal.46 So, what does the 
ICSID annulment allow? 
  In any review regime, usually, two aspects undergo scrutiny, one is the procedural 
legitimacy and the other is the substantive correctness on merit. ICSID annulment only allows the 
first one. As commented in CDC case, 
‘[A]rticle 52(1) looks not to the merits of the underlying dispute as such, but 
rather is concerned with the fundamental integrity of the tribunal, whether basic 
procedural guarantees were largely observed, whether the Tribunal exceeded the 
bounds of the parties’ consent, and whether the Tribunal’s reasoning is both 
coherent and displayed. …. annulment is concerned with the legitimacy of the 
process of decision, rather than with the ‘substantive correctness of the 
decision’47 
The MCI Committee concurred with this decision stating, ‘the role of an ad hoc Committee is a 
limited one, restricted to assessing the legitimacy of the award and not its correctness’.48 These 
decisions pointed out that the Committee is entrusted with enquiring only into the fundamental 
integrity of the tribunal. In doing so, it will examine whether the tribunal observed three duties 
during its decision-making process, namely, compliance to the basic procedural guarantees, non-
encroachment of parties’ agreement and presenting a coherent reasoning throughout the award. If 
the tribunal follows these three duties, its decision will not be subjected to annulment no matter how 
incorrect the award might be. That is why a later Committee concluded that ‘[an] ad hoc Committee 
will not annul an award if the Tribunal’s disposition is tenable, even if the Committee considers that 
                                                 
44 Togo Electricité and GDF-Suez Energie Services v Republic of Togo (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/7) Decision on An-
nulment 6 September 2011 para 50.  
45  Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3) Decision on the Application for Annulment 30 July 2010 para 63; see also Continental Casualty Company v 
Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9) Decision on the Application for Annulment 16 September 2011 para 
81. 
46 Duke Energy International Peru Investments No. 1 Ltd. v Republic of Peru (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/28) Decision 
on the Application for Annulment 1 March 2011 para 144 
47 CDC Group plc v Republic of the Seychelles (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14) Decision on the Application for Annul-
ment 29 June 2005 para 34. 
48 MCI Power Group, LC and New Turbine, Inc v Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6) Decision on An-
nulment 19 October 2009 para 24. 
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it is incorrect as a matter of law’.49 Thus, the ultimate objective of annulment is to scrutinize the 
tribunal’s procedural integrity in delivering the award not to check its correctness.   
  The annulment system looks into only the procedural legitimacy because of the finality 
character of ICSID arbitral award. The MINE Committee depicted this finality character of ICSID 
awards stating ‘…the Convention excludes any attack on the award in national courts. The award is 
final in that sense. It is also final in the sense that even within the framework of the Convention it is 
not subject to review on the merits.’50 It further stated that, 
‘[T]he hoc Committee retains, a measure of discretion in ruling on applications 
for annulment. To be sure, its discretion is not unlimited and should not be 
exercised to the point of defeating the object and purpose of the remedy of 
annulment. It may, however, refuse to exercise its authority to annul an award 
where annulment is clearly not required to remedy procedural injustice and 
annulment would unjustifiably erode the binding force and finality of ICSID 
awards.’51  
Therefore, the main objective of ICSID annulment jurisprudence is to uphold the finality. For 
having it established, they drew a clear line of difference between appeal and annulment 
commenting that establishing correctness will invite introduction of appellate review which 
eventually would vitiate finality, i.e., the ultimate objective of ICSID arbitration. Under the 
principle of finality, every award is presumed to be valid and final.  
 However, what has been achieved by establishing the principle of finality? The achievement is, 
‘once a final arbitral award is rendered, the dispute and related costs issues are resolved, with no 
possibility of appeal’.52 Once there is no appeal, the dispute is relieved of undergoing substantial 
review by any authority, and consuming more money and time. That is how, as Schreuer said, 
finality is designed to serve the purpose of efficiency in terms of an expeditious and economical 
settlement of disputes.53 Thus, providing a ‘timely’, ‘expeditious’ and ‘economical’ settlement of 
                                                 
49 Helnan International Hotels A/S v Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19) Decision of Annulment 14 
June 2010 para 55 
50 MINE, n 28, para 4.02 
51 MINE, n 28,4.10 
52 Stockford, n 24, 340-341 
53 Christoph H. Schreuer, Loretta Malintoppi, August Reinisch, Anthony Sinclair, The ICSID Convention: A Commen-
tary (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 903 
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disputes is the main reason for adopting the principle of finality in ICSID annulment system.54 
Considering the likely consumption of more time and cost in reaching the final decision, even the 
drafters of the ICSID Convention did not intend ICSID annulment to operate like an appeal.55 
However, let’s see how does the ICSID save time and costs?  
IV. Time and costs efficiency in annulment and appellate mechanism 
A. Time and costs in ICSID annulment mechanism  
Diel-Gligor commented that though the parties prefer ICSID arbitration with view to achieving 
time efficiency, it is vulnerable to delaying tactics.56 For a short review on the time consumption in 
the ICSID annulment proceedings, its timeframe needs to be discussed. 
An application for annulment must be submitted within 120 days after the date on which the 
award was rendered.57 Upon receipt of such application, the Chairman will constitute the ad hoc 
Committee to hear the annulment.58 The Convention and Arbitration Rules only provide that the 
Chairman ‘forthwith’ must constitute the ad hoc Committee for disposing the application for 
annulment.59 There is no timeframe for the submission of memorial, counter-memorial, hearing the 
submission and delivering the decision which renders the proceedings to be continued for an 
indefinite period. Moreover, if the effect of annulling an award is considered, it appears more time 
consuming and thereby costly as every award bears interest with it. In a survey it has been found 
that, the average annulment proceeding took 26 months from registration to decision.60 The effect 
of an ICSID annulment is a drastic one because it invalidates the award or part of it as if there were 
no arbitration. Reed and Paulsson commented that unlike an appeal court, an ad hoc Committee 
may not issue a decision substituting its views on any aspect of the case for those of the original 
tribunal.61 The effect of annulment leaves the parties with the only option to arbitrate the same 
matter again following the proceedings of original arbitration by a newly constituted tribunal.62 By 
                                                 
54 ibid 
55 Bondar , n 8, 624  
56 Katharina Diel-Gligor, Systemic Deficiencies of ICSID Investment Arbitration? An Inspection of the Annulment 
Mechanism in Rüdiger Wolfrum, Ina Gätzschmann (eds) International Dispute Settlement: Room for Innovations? 
(Springer 2012) 359, 364 
57 ICSID Convention, art 52 (2) 
58 ICSID Convention, art 52(3) 
59 ICSID Convention, art 52(3); See also Arbitration Rules, r 52(1) 
60  Adam Raviv, ‘A Few Steps to a Faster ICSID’ 8(5) Global Arbitration Review 23, 16 
www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/PDFs/GAR-8-5-ICSID accessed 18 August 
2016. 
61 Reed et al., n 2, 162 
62ICSID Convention art 52(6) 
9 
collecting some data from ICSID website, 63  on those cases which have been resolved finally 
through resubmission and re-annulment (three cases), it reveals that six cases have been decided by 
the resubmission tribunal and one tribunal’s proceedings has been suspended on the agreement of 
the parties. However, it has been discovered that for final disposal of those disputes the minimum 
time was six years and the maximum was 18 years. The average period of resolving these cases was 
12 years. The time, particularly for annulment, has also been found unreasonable ranging from a 
minimum 14 months to a maximum 41 months.  Even after the decision of the resubmitted tribunal, 
three cases underwent to a second annulment proceedings. So, what would be the fate of the dispute 
if the award was annulled for the second time? Would it be the constitution of the third tribunal? 
This phenomenon puts the ICSID arbitration in an unending cycle making the principle of finality 
more relative. 
 
The table below shows the time consumed for resubmitted disputes concluded to date. 
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63 ICSID Cases, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx accessed 5 April 2020. 
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The cost of resolving a dispute is related to the timeframe. Every prolongation in ICSID 
arbitration proceedings results in incurring more costs by the parties. So, the principle of finality 
under ICSID annulment proceedings cannot be claimed to be time and costs effective.  
A. Time and costs in an appellate system  
The analysis hereunder shows that the introduction of appellate mechanism in any institutional 
arbitration may reduce time and costs in two ways: firstly, resolving the dispute finally without 
requiring any further arbitration; secondly, maintaining strict timeframe in appellate proceedings. 
Firstly, in contrast to the annulment, the appellate system seems to be more advantageous in 
ensuring finality because, generally, the appellate court possesses the powers to set aside, remit or 
vary any award which helps resolve the dispute finally with correctness. In this system, the court 
has a greater chance of eliminating error64 in the award substituting its own findings or varying the 
awards or simply setting aside the application for appeal. Like the annulment system, it does not 
only declare an award void, in whole or in part, rather, it remits the case to the original tribunal 
giving the opportunity to resume arbitral proceedings to eliminate defects, i.e., to eliminate the 
grounds for setting aside.65 For example, English law authorizes a court to set aside or remit or vary 
the award in the case of any serious irregularity amounting to a substantial injustice to any party.66 
In the United States, the court may direct a rehearing of a case by arbitration, if the award is 
                                                 
64 Lord Justice Dyson, ‘Finality in Arbitration and Adjudication: The Eversheds Lecture 2000’ (2000) 66(4) Arbitration 
288, 288. 
65 Bondar, n 8, 631. 
66 UK Arbitration Act (UKAA 1996), ss 67, 68. 
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vacated.67 Such powers of appellate authority resolve any dispute finally without requiring any 
further submission to the newly constituted tribunal and rushing to a second or more annulment 
proceedings. 
Secondly, the prevailing concerns over the delay by an appellate mechanism do not seem to be 
material because it could be dealt with a strict timeframe within the appellate process.68 Some 
arbitration authorities successfully established the appellate system to be completed within the 
shortest possible time imposing a strict timeframe such as the WTO’s dispute settlement system. 
This dispute settlement system is considered an effective69 and authoritative judicial institution in 
world politics.70 It provides a right to appeal before the WTO Appellate Body (AB) established by 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).71 This AB possesses the authority to uphold, modify or reverse the 
panel’s findings and decisions.72 The proceedings of this AB generally require to be completed 
within 60 days starting from the date of formal notice of appeal to that of circulation of final 
report.73 If the AB fails to conclude the proceedings within this stipulated period, it, after recording 
the reason for such delay, can extend the time of disposal to maximum 90 days.74 The appellant on 
the same day of a notice of appeal must file the written submission and serve a copy on the other 
parties to the dispute and third parties.75 Any party who wishes to reply to the appeal must file 
written submission within 18 days of the notice of appeal.76 For any third party this time limit is 21 
days.77 If any other party wishes to join as appellant, they must file written submission within five 
days of the notice of appeal.78 A division of the AB will conduct the oral hearing between 30 to 45 
days after the date of the filing of a notice of appeal.79 The appellate report will be circulated within 
the aforementioned 60 to 90 days. Gleason supposes that keeping the arbitral process to such a 
                                                 
67 United States Federal Arbitration Act, s 10. 
68 Stockford, n 24, 343 
69 Carole Murray, David Holloway and Daren Timson-Hunt, Schmitthoff: The Law and Practice of International Trade 
(12th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 975 
70 Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig, Sergio Puig ‘The Extensive (But Fragile) Authority of the WTO Appellate Body’  
(2016) 79(1) Law & Contemporary Problems 237, 238. 
71 WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) art 17.1 & 17.4 
72 Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes- A Unique Contribution 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm  accessed 11 December 2019. 
73 DSU, n 71, art 17.5 
74 Ibid 
75 WTO Working Procedure for Appellate Review (WPAR), r 21(1) 
76 Ibid, r 22(1) 
77 Ibid, r 24 (1) 
78 Ibid r 23 (1) 
79 Ibid, r 27(1) 
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relatively short span of time protects parties from consuming costs and time in the proceedings 
demonstrating that the appeal processes need not invite undue delays to the dispute resolution 
process; costs for parties or an unmanageable caseload for the institution. 80  From the above 
example, it can reasonably be conceived that an appeal mechanism does not consume an inordinate 
amount of time and money if it is framed within a strict schedule of proceedings.  
However, there are some criticisms against such timeframe of WTO AB, as, in recent years, it 
has been proved that both 60-day and 90-day timeframes are insufficient and untenable to complete 
the proceedings effectively. 81 As a result, the AB frequently fails to complete the proceedings 
within the stipulated times. Nevertheless, adoption of a strict timeframe could be supportive, if we 
look into two aspects. First, the AB maintained the 90-day timeframe in most of the cases till 
1999.82 But now it cannot maintain the timeframe because, over the years, the number of appeal-
filing has increased significantly.83 For deciding all these appeals there are only seven permanent 
AB members.84 Ehlermann gives an account as to why this small number of AB members cannot 
complete the proceedings in time. 
‘The Appellate Body’s workload is particularly intense in situations where 
several appeals in different disputes are filed simultaneously or within a short 
period of time. When three or more appeals are pending at the same time, 
several of the seven AB members will be sitting in more than one appeal, so that 
there can be no overlap in the scheduling of hearings and internal meetings for 
those appeals. A separate problem is the extent to which it is possible for an AB 
member to be engaged simultaneously in deliberations, analyze voluminous 
submissions and documents from the panel record, and prepare and revise drafts 
for multiple appeals with parallel time schedules.’          
The situation would be different if the ICSID review regime adopts appellate system with a strict 
timeframe. In ICSID system, the arbitrators will never be overburdened with the increase of appeal-
filing because there are hundreds of qualified arbitrators in the ‘panel of arbitrators'. At present, 
                                                 
80 Erin E Gleason, ‘International Arbitral Appeals: What Are We So Afraid Of?’ (2007) 7(2) Pepperdine Dispute Reso-
lution Law Journal 269, 274 
81 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, ‘The Workload of the WTO Appellate Body: Problems and Remedies’ (2017) 20(3) Journal 
of International Economic Law 705, 710 
82 Ibid 707 
83 Ibid 708 
84 DSU, n 71, art 17.1 
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there are 154 Contracting States85 to the ICSID and each of these States may designate four persons 
to the ‘panel of arbitrators’. In addition, the Chairman may designate ten members to the panel. 
Such a long panel would allow the Chairman to constitute as many ad hoc Committees as 
necessary. Unlike the AB members, one single arbitrator of an ad hoc Committee would not be in 
need of involving in several appeals at the same time. Therefore, like the AB, the ICSID would not 
struggle to complete the appeal proceeding within stipulated time. Second, the existence of a strict 
timeframe has a psychological value which in turn contributes to save unnecessary consumption of 
time in any proceeding. Ehlermann comments, ‘....the time limit has an enormous disciplinary effect 
on the participants, as well as on Appellate Body Members and the Secretariat, and allows for an 
efficient and effective resolution of disputes. 86  Given the situations, there should be a strict 
timeframe to complete the appeal proceedings.   
   
VI. Demands for appeal facility in the ICSID mechanism 
Some investment practitioners and academics argue in favor of adopting an appellate review 
in ICSID arbitral mechanism. 87  Even some Committees 88  felt the temptation for an appellate 
review, though they were cautious about their authority. ICSID itself admits there is increasing 
demand of appellate mechanism in investment arbitration in its discussion paper. 
The ICSID Discussion Paper89 on the ‘Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID 
Arbitration’ dated 22 October 2004, should, briefly, be discussed here. The annexure to this 
Discussion Paper started with a proposal to adopt a set of ICSID Appeals Facility Rules by the 
Administrative Council. Since the amendment of the ICSID Convention requires unanimous 
ratification of the Contracting States, it proposed adoption of Appeals Facility Rules so that the 
parties to any treaty may freely opt either to undergo an appeal facility or remain aloof from it.90 
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ments of the Framework For ICSID Arbitration’, n 89 
14 
Like the WTO AB, there would be an Appeals Panel composed of 15 persons elected by the 
Administrative Council.91 A three members’ Appellate Tribunal (AT) for a particular appeal could 
be constituted from the panel by the Secretary-General after consultation with the parties as far as 
possible.92 The AT could be, in addition to the specified grounds in article 52 of ICSID Convention, 
authorized to hear appeals on the grounds of clear error of law and serious error of facts93 and it 
might annul, uphold, modify or reverse the award drawing the finality of it.94 In case of such an 
annulment or modification or reversal of any award, either party could submit the case to a new 
arbitral tribunal under the same rules as the first arbitral tribunal.95 Following the WTO timeframe, 
for speedy disposal of the dispute, there would be specific time limits for the appeal proceedings 
from the date of registering the request.96 
The proposal discussed above considerably imitated the WTO appellate mechanism. The 
proposal, though seemingly useful, was abandoned by most of the Contracting States commenting 
that it would be premature to attempt to establish such an ICSID mechanism at this stage. 97 
Although, about sixteen years ago, ICSID members discarded the proposal of adopting an appeal 
facility, it still has some efficacies. Sacerdoti and Recanati commented, ‘the issue is still of interest, 
on the one hand, because of the reference to an appellate mechanism made recently in several 
investment agreements and, on the other hand, because of the uncertainty stemming from the 
inconsistent case law of ICSID Annulment Committees. 98 So, now the time has come to rethink the 
matter. 
VII. A prospective framework of appeal in ICSID mechanism 
Marchili while discussing the possibility of this appellate mechanism and its consequences 
posed some questions.99 Whether there would be an appellate court or an appellate body with 
different panels? What would be the scope of review of the appellate court? Would it still be able to 
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annul the decision or only revert it? Who would select the members of appellate panel? How the 
investors would be represented in the panel? To sum up, the concerns are related to two matters, 
first, the composition of the panel and constitution of the appellate tribunal; second, the extent of 
the tribunal’s review power.  
First, although the proposal imitated WTO AB mechanism, there was a significant 
difference in the composition of the panel of arbitrators for this appellate body. WTO AB is a 
permanent body of seven persons100 whereas ICSID appellate panel was proposed to be composed 
of 15 members out of which three ad hoc members would constitute the AT being appointed by the 
Secretary-General. Some commentators namely Sacerdoti and Recanati expressed doubt that 
entrusting the appeal with ad hoc adjudicators would not ensure the consistency of the standards of 
review applied on appeal nor ensure uniformity of interpretation.101 This doubt can be overcome by 
preparing the panel of arbitrators with qualified, efficient and experienced arbitrators. There may be 
a separate panel of arbitrators for appeal who would be selected out of the designees forwarded by 
the Contracting States and the Chairman of ICSID. During this designation, both the States and the 
Chairman should designate qualified persons to the panel responsibly and following some specified 
criteria. The Administrative Council of ICSID or a Committee under it, upon proper scrutiny, would 
nominate those arbitrators for the appeal panel. This procedure would satisfy the commentators’ 
concerns as to the composition of the panel of arbitrators for appeal because such a separate panel 
of arbitrators would contribute to the development of consistent investment jurisprudence. One 
concern still left to be satisfied is the question of investors’ representation on the panel. Since the 
investors are entitled to be a party of ICSID arbitration because they are the nationals of 
Contracting States, 102  any designation by the Contracting States should be deemed their 
representation. In addition, during the composition of any Appellate Tribunal (AT), there may be a 
system of ‘party consultation’ 103  or ‘party preference’ whereby parties including the investors 
would be entitled to forward their arbitrators from the panel of arbitrators for appeal. Under the 
‘party-preference’ system, the parties may send a confidential letter of preference mentioning three 
names from the appeal panel to the Chairman who may appoint anyone out of them. It is mention-
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worthy that ICSID has implemented a practice of preference voting for selecting arbitrators for its 
original arbitration when it is asked for. Under this system, the Secretariat gives the parties a ballot 
naming three potential arbitrators and asking simply ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the names proposed.104 A 
reverse practice may evolve for selecting a member of the AT wherein the parties will give three 
names from the panel and ask the Chairman to appoint anyone of them. This ‘party consultation’ 
and ‘party preference’ seems a reasonable way of ensuring investors’ representation to the AT. 
Second, the proposed ICSID Appeals Facility provided that appeal can be sought on three 
sets of grounds- (i) the existing grounds specified in article 52; (ii) clear error of law and (iii) 
serious error of facts. However, the present ICSID grounds of annulment represent only the 
procedural legitimacy of the award. Adding the grounds relating to the error of law as well as facts 
would widen the scope of review. It has been observed that WTO Appellate Body is entitled to 
review the question of law and legal interpretation of the panel only.105  Some other countries like 
the USA, China, and New Zealand provide a review on law excluding the fact.106 Likewise, English 
law specifies some serious irregularities amounting to substantial injustice as the grounds of the 
challenge against an arbitral award.107 It even made an appeal on law optional providing the parties 
an opportunity to exclude any prospective appeal on points of law.108 Under this law, the general 
approach of the court would be supportive to arbitration and the court would only interfere for 
rectifying the glaring and indefensible irregularities.109 Following the instances of WTO and these 
national legislations, the review on the question of fact could be trimmed out and a narrow approach 
to reviewing on law, legal interpretation and procedural irregularities could be adopted as grounds 
of appeal. For further development of ICSID jurisprudence, the decisions of the AT could have 
legal effect, i.e., development through precedent. At present, though the arbitral awards do not have 
any binding precedent, those have some persuasive values.110 There is also an unofficial recognition 
of precedent in ICSID system. For instance, Mr. Ziadé, a Deputy Secretary-General of ICSID, states 
that they extend secretarial supports with a view to raising arbitrators’ awareness on the existing 
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case laws.111 Raising the arbitrators’ awareness on the case laws strengthens their persuasive values 
and thereby proves an existence of soft precedent in the ICSID system. If a formal precedent system 
is established, it will ensure consistency and predictability of investment law112 and accuracy and 
uniformity of interpretation of treaties.113 As regard the extent of powers, the proposed Appeals 
Facility Rules providing the power to set aside, modify or reverse the award is acceptable. The 
proposal regarding remission to the original tribunal appears unjustified because it may increase the 
complexity requiring reconstitution of the tribunal. So, the power to set aside, modify and reverse 
the award will ensure both finality and correctness of ICSID AT’s award because it resolves the 
dispute completely without requiring the parties for pursuing resubmission. In exercising these 
powers, the AT may adopt a supportive attitude to the award rendered by the tribunal. In 
interpreting any legal issue, the AT may follow precedent for a predictable and consistent 
development of ICSID jurisprudence.  
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